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Spiritedness in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra**

Werner Dannhauser

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Whatever else spiritedness may be, it is surely difficult to define. Good teachers like Joseph Cropsey[1] wisely tell us that a good part of wisdom consists of working toward the definition of significant terms instead of beginning with them, but we do want to 'find a handle' for a fruitful progress of inquiry. To put it more simply, we need a preliminary answer to a legitimate question: What are we talking about when we speak of spiritedness?

For present purposes, a beguilingly simple answer suggests itself. By spiritedness we mean primarily, though perhaps not exclusively, what Plato means by *thymos* in *The Republic*. Therefore, when trying to understand Nietzsche's view of spiritedness in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, we can begin with the German word for the Greek word *thymos*.

At this point, our difficulties begin, though most of them present no insuperable obstacles. Nietzsche, a professor of classical philology for a number of years, had no need to resort to any translation of the term *thymos*; he enjoyed reading the Greek classics in Greek.[2] He has, however, next to nothing to say about the term *thymos* itself.[3] Yet Nietzsche is surely a philosopher and as such concerned with the whole of things, especially the human part of the whole. Whatever else spiritedness as *thymos* may be, it is surely an estimable part of the human part of the whole; it is therefore a phenomenon Nietzsche must have addressed in one way or another.

We can well suppose that *thymos* crept into German philosophical usage by way of a translation. In the nineteenth century, Plato had found a German translator of unusual competence and high standards of literalness, Schleiermacher, whose translation of *The Republic* enjoyed both popularity and authority. Nietzsche knew Schleiermacher's work as translator and writer; moreover, he probably owned a copy of his translations.[4] Perhaps he used Schleiermacher's translation of *thymos*.

Surprisingly enough, Schleiermacher renders *thymos* as *Eifer*, the German

for 'zeal.' We thus learn something of the enigmatic quality of the term. In discussing spiritedness and *thymos*, scholars most often refer to *anger*, *nobility*, and *indignation*, and *zeal* does not at once remind us of those reasonable equivalents. *Eifer* can come close to 'fervor,' but in everyday German it means little more than eagerness or industriousness. For example, we refer to the eagerness of schoolchildren to learn as their *Eifer*. Did Schleiermacher assimilate Plato to modern rationalism as was the tendency of the time, by rendering *thymos* a bit more softly than others would?

Our task is not to answer that question but to find out what Nietzsche had to say about *Eifer*. What is more, the Nietzsche indices are probably right in suggesting that he had nothing to say. We might suspect as much from the fact that in German *Eifer* is part of *Eifersucht*, which means 'jealousy' and can be rendered as 'addition to zeal.' Various plays on words suggest themselves, and this use of *Eifer* would be one of those rare cases on record when Nietzsche did not seize an opportunity for verbal play. (Incidentally, both Schleiermacher and Goethe rose to the occasion.)[5]

Eifer can be found in the works of Nietzsche, but it is a common enough word that we would have to explain its absence rather than its presence. It is more to the point that in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* the word *Eifer* is used with extreme casualness, and primarily in part IV of the book, the part about which it can be argued whether it is integral to Nietzsche's magnum opus.[6] In one of those adventures that would be bizarre for ordinary human beings, Zarathustra passes some cows who seem to be listening *mit Eifer* (eagerly) to a speaker. Hearing a human voice in the midst of the herd and fearing that somebody may have been hurt, Zarathustra jumps up *mit Eifer* and pushes the animals apart. His fears prove unfounded, for the man, the 'voluntary beggar' after whom the speech is named, has suffered no harms.[7] The use of the term *Eifer* in connection with the incident offers no occasion or need for interpretation in depth. Nietzsche treats neither *thymos* nor *Eifer* in his work, so our investigation has reached a dead end.

We are forced to begin again, to pursue a new line of inquiry. If we were asked to render spiritedness in German, what would we say? Moreover, what term does Nietzsche use when discussing the phenomena *The Republic* treats under the rubric of *thymos*? In answer to both of these questions no better word comes up than *Mut*. The leading dictionaries lend their support to this translation, though the most obvious and primary English equivalent of *Mut* is 'courage.' That need not deter us, if only because of the intimate connection in *The Republic* between *thymos* and courage. In that book the three-part division of the soul parallels the three-part division of the polis. *Thymos* issues from the part of the soul paralleled by the soldiers of *The Republic*, whose special attribute is obviously courage.[8]

Mut can also mean 'mood,' as the phonetic closeness of those two words suggests. This secondary meaning aids our investigation; for the mood that

we have or suffer depends on how spirited or dis-spirited we are; mood is inseparable from spiritedness.

The richness of the term *Mut* in German depends in part on a noteworthy characteristic of the German language: we can put almost anything in front of those three letters and fashion a word that no longer obviously refers to courage. For example, *Armut* means 'poverty.'[9] A number of things can also be added to *Mut* to make different words. Nietzsche, almost obsessively playful with the German language, does both, as shown below.

New words also take on a life of their own in the English language (though to an appreciably lesser extent than in German), so that we forget their derivation. Thus, when we speak of discouraging somebody, we do not usually remember that to discourage has something – almost everything – to do with taking away courage. Similarly, when we *encourage* somebody, we try to give him courage. We usually forget to think of it that way. One of the many useful tasks performed by poets and philosophers is to remind us of basic truths by way of making clear the genius of language. In his incomparably elegant and eloquent way, Nietzsche teaches us about the varieties of courage and of spiritedness.

The beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* surprises us by manifesting no special interest in courage. The fact that it has a great deal to say about virtue in general legitimates our surprise. We could suppose that Nietzsche's analysis moves from virtue in general to specific virtues, and that proves to be correct overall, but it does not explain everything. 'Zarathustra's Prologue' dwells on virtue as such and its relation to reason and happiness, but the prologue mentions wisdom and not courage.[10]

We come closer to an explanation when we realize that in Nietzsche's scheme destructiveness must precede constructiveness and play an integral part in it. Zarathustra finds no need and little occasion to speak of courage while performing his necessary task of destruction because he has nothing destructive to say about courage, at least when courage is compared or contrasted with other virtues.[11]

An even more plausible explanation suggests itself: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* begins with a critique of traditional morality, with the virtues and vices as conventionally understood by 'the good and the just.'[12] In terms of both nineteenth-century Europe and Nietzsche's view, conventional morality means Christian morality. Whatever we could say about Christian morality, we would be hard put to say that it assigns a prominent or preeminent place to courage. Since Nietzsche's Zarathustra begins by tearing down Christian morality, he naturally has little to say at first about courage.[13]

This should not be taken to suggest that what the prologue and book I have to say about virtue in general is useless in our attempt to understand courage or spiritedness in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The second speech of book I, 'On the Chairs of Virtue,' proves instructive. In that speech, a boring teacher

propounds a tepid teaching about virtues and makes the students sleepy. Thus, we learn something of Nietzsche's task: to inspirit the virtues and supplement them with spiritedness; moreover, we discover that one has to draw limits to the virtues. Virtues are jealous of each other; each particular virtue wishes to reign supreme and pass for the whole of virtue; in Zarathustra's universe one virtue is worth more than two virtues.[14] The book clearly announces a contest, an *agon* among virtues, and one soon suspects that the victor will be courage.

The emergence and triumph of courage comes about gradually in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In fact, the, speeches of part I contain a reference to *Hochmut* ('arrogance' or literally 'high courage') before mentioning *Mut*, courage proper.[15] Only a passing reference is made to *Mut* in the chapter 'On War and Warriors,' where Zarathustra asserts that 'war and courage' have accomplished greater things than love of one's neighbor.[16] But the explanation for this semi-silence proves simple: for strictly martial virtue Nietzsche uses the word *Tapferkeit*, which translates as 'bravery' or 'valor,' though he does so inconsistently. It makes rough sense to use a special word for the courage of soldiers, for if we equate their excellence with courage simply, we must, as one does in English, talk almost at once about phenomena like 'civil courage.'

The first sustained reference to courage as such, not bravery, occurs in the speech 'On Reading and Writing,' the seventh speech in part I. In that speech, Zarathustra mocks the usual writing and reading of the time – our time – for being heavy-footed, clumsy, tedious, at once too serious and not serious enough. As an alternative he praises writing in 'blood and maxims,' the words of those who wish and deserve to be 'learned by heart,' rather than read. Maxims resemble mountain peaks, and their author must know how to live in rarefied air, must possess a spirit full of 'gay malice.' Zarathustra is such a man; he states, 'I want to have goblins around me for I am courageous (*mutig*). Courage (*Mut*) that puts ghosts to flight creates goblins for itself: courage wishes to laugh.' Shortly thereafter, Zarathustra proclaims, 'courageous, unconcerned, mocking, violent – thus wisdom wants us: she is woman and always loves only a warrior.'[17]

Great writing and wise reading, then, require a combination of verve and nerve, a kind of spiritedness Nietzsche calls courage. (This notion of courage should encourage all those who specialize in turning to the pen rather than the sword.) We notice at once that courage is not simply a moral virtue, and Nietzsche will make that abundantly clear later on in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

Zarathustra remains relatively silent about courage while dwelling on the social dimension of virtue in general, thus preparing us for a different and differing appreciation of it. Nietzsche gives virtue its due because of the low but solid ground of its usefulness to society. If human beings are to live

together with the requisite amount of concern, certain rules must be obeyed, certain characteristics cultivated, certain dispositions honored. One needs virtues for the sake of political life. Ordinary courage is of such utility: unless a goodly number of citizens prefer death to dishonor, their country cannot survive. The survival of the group demands the willingness of individuals to die for their country.

Zarathustra recognizes but ultimately disdains the utilitarian argument for virtue in general and for courage in particular. Zarathustra's talk of *Mut* increases as his contact with mankind decreases. In the prologue, he attempts to persuade the many of mankind's need to transcend itself by producing the superman. He fails miserably. Thereupon, in part I, he confines himself to educating and exhorting a group of disciples in a town called the Motley Cow. In part II, he returns to the task of spreading and defending his teaching, but this time he chooses a more exclusive locale, and presumably a more select audience, on the Blessed Isles. He bids farewell to these disciples as well and, in book III, returns to his lonely mountain top. He now talks mostly to himself, fully aware of the dangers and problems of such an endeavor.[18]

In setting the stage for the discussion of courage in part III of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, we must plot the development of the argument in regard to virtue. For the sake of brevity we have to schematize rather ruthlessly and thus be less than perfectly faithful to the complexities of the book.

Zarathustra understands himself as a man whose task consists of nothing less than revaluation and transvaluation of all virtues. Traditional virtue requires transvaluation because the death of God has rendered it groundless, baseless, and arbitrary. With the death of God, man must cease to be man, having previously been constituted by his faith in God and by the virtues depending on the existence of God. It had been thought, for example, that a man owed his fellow man a good deal simply because he was a child of God. Traditional teachings of virtue base themselves on the existence of God (or at least on the existence of transcendent standards), viewing all human beings as equally creative, equally sinful (or at least deficient when judged by transcendent standards).

With the death of God, man must necessarily become more than he has been, the superman, or less, the last man.[19] The superman will need new virtues, for the old have been discredited. They have aimed at rendering man a useful member of the herd rather than a unique self and have wrongly emphasized parsimony, a bourgeois pettiness, at the expense of extravagance or extravagant squandering. And they have diminished human beings rather than encouraged them to become who they are.[20] Zarathustra attempts to provide humanity with new tablets of morality, which, to be sure, can only be half-finished, since the uniqueness of the unique self sets limits to the general rules it can be expected to follow.[21]

Zarathustra provides us with numerous examples of the revaluation and

transvaluation he effects or half-effects. In the first speech of part II, he transforms wisdom into 'wild wisdom,' freeing it from the niggardly constraints of logic and the kind of argumentation that shuns contradiction and makes a fetish of consistency. Zarathustra's wild wisdom is no longer what philosophers have traditionally loved or possessed. Indeed, it resembles poetry more than it resembles traditional philosophy.[22]

Justice is revalued so that its traditional emphasis on equality yields to a new emphasis on hierarchy, rank order, and the inequality of everything.[23]

Apparently, moderation resists all attempts to transvalue it. Transvaluation involves radicalization, and a radicalized moderation ceases to be moderation. Therefore Zarathustra simply dismisses it with yet another play on words. He stresses the closeness of moderation, *Mässigkeit*, to mediocrity, *Mittelmässigkeit*.[24]

A number of other virtues undergo a similar treatment at the hands of Zarathustra; for example, prudence is transfigured almost beyond recognition.[25] We have, however, deliberately restricted the evidence to the four cardinal virtues and now turn to the missing one.

What of courage? Perhaps it stands in no need of revaluation or transvaluation because it lacks nothing and requires no enhancement. We can argue that nothing needs fixing here because Zarathustra never has any fault to find with courage. He does not find it contemptible nor has he a bad word for it.

Nevertheless, one can readily see that courage profits from adornment. Nietzsche's terminology leads one gently to the conclusion that courage, *Mut*, can be enhanced by becoming *Anmut*, which is a kind of graciousness or gracefulness, and ultimately *Grossmut*, literally great courage, which means great-souledness or magnanimity. Zarathustra connects these terms in a speech entitled 'On Those Who Are Sublime,' which is devoted to the elevation of human beings to the truly beautiful.[26]

We cannot, however, leave it at the need for the mere adornment of courage. Zarathustra must effect a real transvaluation of courage because courage has too many ties to the spirit of revenge and to the spirit of gravity that he dedicates himself to vanquishing.[27]

Courage is akin to the will to power because it almost always entails overcoming. A soldier devotes himself to overcoming the enemy without and the fear of death within. Overcoming turns out to be steady work because things resist being overcome. Recalcitrance characterizes both the external and internal enemies that courage confronts.

The world is such that it calls for courage, but it also limits the range of courage. Apparently, no way exists to overcome time and its ravages, it being in the nature of time to pass.[28] In time, all human beings die; time mocks all human aspirations and turns all the works of man to dust.

In the face of time's harsh sovereignty, courage can come to display a bitter kind of railing. It breeds resentment at what it fails to overcome. The

courageous man then resembles somebody who beats his head against unyielding walls.

Nietzsche has a number of terms to describe the curdlings of courage. *Mut*, courage, too easily turns into *Schwermut*, literally heavy courage, which means melancholy.[29] Or it can decline into *Unmut*, which can mean anything from discouragement to grumpiness and disgruntlement. In discouragement, gnawing worms parasitically degenerate the high into the low.[30] Nietzsche's playful use of words as he treats of the damages to courage should not blind us to the fact that he thinks courage is always needed and that in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* the need for it continues and intensifies as the argument develops.[31]

For the last time, we must resort to over-schematization and recapitulate the development of the argument in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In the first part of the book, Zarathustra concerns himself primarily with the consequences of the death of God, the major consequence being that man can and must cease to be man and become superman. In the second part of the book, we find the articulation of Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power. Zarathustra's discovery – or creation – of that doctrine at once reveals the deep problems connected with the will to power. Man could be the animal who can will anything, but no God or transcendent standard exists any longer to guide him in his willing. Moreover, the irrevocable, inexorable passing of time mocks man's power of willing, his will to power.

In response to these and kindred problems, the third part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* becomes necessary so that Zarathustra can will the eternal recurrence of the same. Man compensates for the death of God by affirming all, by saying yes to the world as it is. He finds a worthy goal in the consecration of the world, no longer having any need of otherworldly aspirations. Moreover, if all things recur infinitely, man will be able to will the past by willing the future; man will be able to become the cause of himself. The grim turn courage took can be transfigured. Thinking such profound, not to say unfathomable, thoughts, Zarathustra finds himself, to repeat, in solitude.

Courage soon comes to the fore and Zarathustra's praise of it reaches a climax. The second speech of part III is entitled 'On The Vision and The Riddle,' and it refers to Zarathustra's enigmatic vision of the eternal return of the same. In order to live up to the awesome task of willing the eternal return of the same, Zarathustra must summon up his courage to combat the spirit of gravity (a dwarf), the gloom that weighs him down, the despondency that keeps him from total affirmation. He therefore says:

> But there is something in me that I call courage: that has so far slain my every discouragement. This courage finally bade me stand still and speak: 'Dwarf! it is you or I!'

> For courage is the best slayer, courage which *attacks*; for in every attack there is playing and brass.
>
> Man, however, is the most courageous animal, hence he overcomes every animal. With playing and brass he has so far overcome every pain; but human pain is the deepest pain.
>
> Courage also slays dizziness at the edge of abysses: and where does man not stand at the edge of abysses? Is not seeing always seeing abysses?
>
> Courage is the best slayer: courage slays even pity. But pity is the deepest abyss: as deeply as man sees into life, he also sees into suffering.
>
> Courage, however, is the best slayer – courage which attacks, which slays even death itself, for it says: 'Was *that* life? Well, then! Once more!'[32]

The above passage deserves detailed explication, but for our purposes two comments will provide sufficient exegesis.

First of all, we should notice that at this juncture courage or spiritedness has been magnified to such an extent that it has become almost synonymous with the will to power itself. For example, courage here gets credit for man's overcoming man's animality and thus becoming man. It will presumably also get credit for man's overcoming his humanity to become superman. Nietzsche more often writes of the will to power in such terms.

Second, on the basis of this passage, we can state categorically what we have previously only suggested. Courage is all important because it is not only a moral virtue but also an intellectual one. Courage is the quality of mind most needed by the mind as it faces the utter and comprehensive meaninglessness of life. That meaninglessness must be affirmed, lest the spirit of revenge corrode us and we face a hostile world with bitterness and resentment. In fact, most meaninglessness must be willed, for when we will the eternal return of the same we will the most meaningless of all possible universes, a world in which everything happens again and again and again without rhyme or reason. Man needs courage to face the truth – to pursue it – when the truth has ceased to be beautiful. Truth may be a woman[33] but that woman may be old and gnarled and ugly.[34]

The fact that courage as such is praised does not mean that courage cannot undergo transvaluation. Once more we turn to Nietzsche's use of words as a way of instructing ourselves.

The transvaluation of man means that man becomes superman; *Mensch* becomes *Übermensch*. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is loaded, perhaps overloaded, with terms to which Nietzsche prefixes the words *über* or *unter*, over (or super-) and under (or sub-).[35] Is there, then, an over-courage or a super-courage? There is, indeed.

Übermut, literally super-courage or over-courage, is one of those words which, in German, has assumed a life of its own, as it were, so much in daily

usage that it is not always connected with courage. It means playfulness or even prankishness. Zarathustra uses it almost interchangeably with *Mutwille*, literally courage-will, which can mean mischievousness, wantonness and petulance.

Mischievous playfulness is, in a certain way, what Zarathustra has in mind for mankind's future. Men have been camels, beasts bearing the burdens of moral obligation. With the death of God, they become lions, destructively exercising their will. But while lions use their will, they lack positive goals, and thus they become nihilists. The final metamorphosis of the spirit means that man must become a child. Children play games without bothering, or having to bother, about the meaning – or meaninglessness – of what they do. Their play confutes the spirit of gravity in speech and refutes it in deed.[36]

Zarathustra bestows lavish praise on *Übermut* and *Mutwille*, on playfulness and prankishness, in the third part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. He celebrates the strength required for them once he has attained that strength. Super-courage takes the place of mundane rationality; and in a song on the Mount of Olives, Zarathustra substitutes prankishness for grave piety.[37]

Zarathustra's exuberance after his willing of the eternal return reaches its peak in 'The Other Dancing Song.' The title alludes to a dancing song in part II, in which life had mocked and bested Zarathustra. Now, however, Zarathustra has become the equal of life, whose lover he prides himself on being. Having understood the eternal return of the same, he has understood life. As the lover of life he can address it in endearing terms. In this song, Zarathustra lovingly calls life a prankster – an *Übermut*.[38]

Courage gives way to super-courage; the higher playfulness vanquishes the spirit of gravity; the will to power persists even in its overcoming of itself; bliss attends one's willing of the eternal return of the same as one takes the world with a sense of acceptance and even gratitude – and yet *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* ultimately educes more sadness than triumphant affirmation.

That feeling owes a good deal to the realization the book forces on us that the note of triumph that attends overcoming sounds for one moment only. Then time does its work and we must gird ourselves for the next task. In one way, therefore, the book simply reinforces an experience many of us have had with courage. We beat up the bully, or defend the good cause, and then think we have conquered our cowardice and that henceforth we will be steadily courageous. The next day it turns out that not much has changed. The bully instills fear; one has a sickening urge to abandon the good cause: one is a coward again.

In the fourth and final part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra experiences a noon of happiness when 'the world is perfect.' But noon precedes afternoon and heralds night; time passes.[39] The whole of the last part buttresses this insight. By this time, presumably, Zarathustra has attained the rank of superman, and a superman is somebody who has conquered the

human – all too human – feelings of pity that divert an ordinary man from his great tasks. Yet Zarathustra must continue to resist the temptations that pity exerts.

In general, we can say that the tone of book IV of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* comes across as more muted and subdued than we might expect as sequel to Zarathustra's glorious willing of the eternal return of the same. For example it contains a poem about 'heavy courage,' *Schwermut*, melancholy, a 'Song of Melancholy' in a chapter bearing that title.[40] We can argue that the song is sung not by Zarathustra but by one of the quaint 'higher men' of the final part, the magician. That does not explain, however, Nietzsche's willingness to sing substantially the same song in his own name, in the 'Dionysian Dithyrambs.'[41]

Courage surely receives its due in the whole of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The philosophic tradition may have done less than perfect justice to spiritedness, but in Nietzsche's work it comes into its own.

The trouble is that it comes into its own with a vengeance. Nietzsche's human world, in the end, seems to contain *only* spiritedness, except perhaps for the deadly and deadening sloth that characterizes the last man.

The spiritedness that combats sloth, in turn, turns out to be increasingly difficult to distinguish from energy without focus, from frenzy. It has no aim in view, no goal it can set itself. It lacks dignity for the things that would dignify it even while limiting it – Nietzsche has denied the existence of all such things. Courage may account for the whole prehistory of man,[42] but when it comes into its own there is no real ground for rejoicing.

No wonder, then, that one of the last comments Zarathustra makes about courage compares it to looking into the abyss with pride.[43] Time keeps on passing, and the abyss keeps on confronting man, for whom spiritedness brings no happiness.

Notes

1. My debts to Joseph Cropsey go beyond the possibility of specific acknowledgment in footnotes, as does my indebtedness to our common teacher, Leo Strauss.

2. The details of Nietzsche's classical training can be found in Richard Blunck, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Kindheit und Jugend* (Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1953).

3. The index on which I have drawn most extensively is by Karl Schlechta, *Nietzsche Index zu den Werken in drei Bänden* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1965). However, I also consulted the indices to a number of other edition – with identical results.

4. All references to Nietzsche in German will be to the edition edited by Karl Schlechta, *Nietzsche: Werke in drei Bänden* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1954–1956). For Nietzsche's familiarity with Schleiermacher, consider vol. I, pp. 164, 193, 268, 532, 965, 1137; vol. II, p. 1149.

5. German has an eerie saying for which both are given credit: *Eifersucht ist die Leidenschuft die mit Eifer sucht was Leiden schafft*. It literally means 'Jealousy is the passion that zealously seeks what causes suffering,' but is a multiple and untranslatable pun.

6. The necessary philological information can be found in Schlechta, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 1373–76.
7. Ibid., vol. II, p. 506 in the speech, 'The Voluntary Beggar.' All references to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* will be the version appearing in vol. II of the Schlechta edition.
8. See Plato, *The Republic*, especially 375a–375e, 411a–411e, and 439e–441c. The edition translated by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968) contains helpful material on *thymos*.
9. For suggestive references to *Armut*, see Schlechta, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 321, 363, 423, 521.
10. Ibid., p. 288.
11. In this essay I take the liberty of using Nietzsche and Zarathustra almost interchangeably. Nietzsche himself almost grants that liberty in *Ecce Homo*. In particular see Schlechta, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 1115–16 1128–40.
12. For typical comments on 'the good and the just,' see ibid., pp. 459, 1156.
13. The only historical personage to be mentioned in the book, apart from Zarathustra, is Jesus, ibid., p. 335.
14. Ibid., p. 283.
15. Ibid., p. 293.
16. Ibid., p. 312.
17. Ibid., p. 306. An English translation of the speech, from which the quotation is taken, can be found in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 40–41.
18. On Zarathustra's growing solitude, see my *Nietzsche's View of Socrates* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 241–69.
19. See the prologue to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in Schlechta, op. cit., pp. 277 91.
20. Ibid., pp. 417–22.
21. Ibid., pp. 443–61.
22. Ibid., p. 343.
23. See especially Zarathustra's address to the 'preachers of equality' in 'On the Tarantulas,' ibid., pp. 356–59.
24. Ibid., p. 420.
25. Ibid., p. 396–99.
26. Ibid., pp. 372–75.
27. For the spirit of revenge, see for examples, ibid., pp. 357, 395; for the spirit of gravity, see for examples, pp. 305–07, 406–11.
28. Nietzsche made this point in his early essay 'On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life.' See Schlechta, op. cit., vol. I, p. 345.
29. For characteristic references to *Schwermut*, see Schlechta, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 310, 335, 405, 468–69, 501.
30. See especially ibid., p. 401.
31. Ibid., p. 433.
32. Ibid., pp. 407–08. I have used the translation by Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 157.
33. See the beginning of *Beyond Good and Evil* in Schlechta, op. cit., vol. II, p. 565.
34. See ibid., pp. 328–30.
35. See especially the prologue, ibid., pp. 277–91.
36. Ibid., p. 294.
37. Ibid., pp. 413, 416, 423–24.
38. Ibid., p. 471.
39. Ibid., pp. 512–15.
40. Ibid., pp. 531–36.
41. Ibid., pp. 1240–42.
42. Ibid., p. 534.
43. Ibid., p. 524.